Strategic Effects of Investment and Private Information: The Incumbent&apos;s Curse by Brighi, L. & D&apos
 
 
 
 
[ 1 ] 
 
 
 
DEMB Working Paper Series 
 
 
N. 121 
 
Strategic Effects of Investment and Private Information: 
The Incumbent's Curse 
 
Luigi Brighi *, Marcello D’Amato ** 
 
 
December  2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*     University of Modena and Reggio Emilia 
RECent, Centre for Economic Research 
Address: Viale Berengario 51, 41121, Modena, Italy 
Email: luigi.brighi@unimore.it 
 
** University of Salerno 
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Celpe, Csef 
Address: via Ponte Don Melillo 80144, Salerno, Italy 
Email: damato@unisa.it  
    
 
 
ISSN: 2281-440X online 
Strategic Effects of Investment and Private Information:
The Incumbent’s Cursea
Luigi Brighib Marcello D’Amatoc
December 2017
Abstract
We study a two-period entry model where the incumbent, privately informed about his cost of
production, makes a long run investment choice along with a pricing decision. Investment is cost-
reducing and its effects are assumed to differ across incumbent’s types, as a result investment plays
a double role as a commitment variable and, along with price, as a signal. We ask whether and how
investment decisions allow the incumbent to limit entry into the market. We find that the incumbent
will never undertake strategic investment to deter profitable entry, because when incumbent’s costs are
private information the signaling role of investment cancels out its value of commitment.
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1 Introduction
We study a two-period entry problem where the incumbent has the opportunity to make a long-term
investment choice along with a pricing decision. The incumbent is privately informed about his cost
of production and investment is cost-reducing. The level of investment is decided in the first period
and affects current and future costs. We suppose that the cost reducing impact differs across types
of incumbent, a key assumption suggested by the heterogeneity of production costs.
The originality of the model we set out to study in this paper rests on the double role played
by investment. Being observable and having persistent effects, investment has a commitment value
as in the classical models studied by Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980). On the other hand, having
different cost reducing effects across types, investment is also a signal of incumbent’s costs along
with price. Our primary interest is to understand how the double role of investment, as commitment
variable and as a signal, affects incumbent’s behaviour. In particular, we are interested to know
how and to what extent the commitment value of investment can be used by the incumbent for
entry deterrence purposes, in combination with predatory pricing, in an environment with private
information. Answering these questions is relevant for both competition policy analysis and the
study of managerial strategies in imperfectly competitive sectors.
The structure of the entry problem is standard. First, Nature selects incumbent’s costs which
can be either low or high. After observing his cost, the incumbent makes a choice about first-
period output (or equivalently price) and investment. Then, after observing incumbent’s choice, a
potential entrant decides whether to enter or not into the market. If entry takes place the entrant
learns incumbent’s cost and the firms compete a` la Cournot. Otherwise, the incumbent remains a
monopolist. This entry problem is formalized as a game with multiple signals. The notion of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium is used as the solution concept and the Intuitive Criterion is applied to refine
equilibria.
Our major result is that an incumbent who is privately informed about his costs can not take
full advantage of investment, in fact he will never invest strategically to deter profitable entry. Our
analysis shows that there exist pooling equilibria where, as in Milgrom and Roberts (1982), the
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incumbent achieves deterrence. However, the most plausible outcome of the game is that the ineffi-
cient incumbent will invest to accommodate entry while the efficient one will cut down investment
to zero and charge a limit price to signal his cost to the potential entrant, who will stay out. Under
no circumstances profitable entry can be deterred, because the commitment value of investment to
the inefficient incumbent is cancelled out by its signaling role to the efficient type. This conclusion
follows from the formal analysis of the game where it is shown that there is a unique separating
equilibrium which survives the Intuitive Criterion while all the pooling equilibria fail this test.
The basic insight of our result is that the opportunity to invest in an environment characterized
by private information is a sort of incumbent’s curse as it prevents the inefficient type from using
investment as a commitment device. Although the opportunity to invest may raise the incentive
to mimic by the inefficient incumbent and may allow him to behave strategically, the heterogeneity
of the cost-reducing impact of investment makes revelation of costs cheaper to the efficient type
and it is this latter force that drives the equilibrium outcome. The major policy implication of this
result is that, in the presence of private information, limit pricing strategies are not likely to support
deterrence of profitable entry when the incumbent has the opportunity to invest.1
Our paper contributes to the vast literature on business strategies originated from the early
work by Spence (1977), Dixit (1980), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Bulow, Geanakoplos and
Klemperer (1985) among others. Our model extends previous analysis because, by introducing
entrant’s uncertainty about incumbent’s cost and an heterogeneous impact of the cost reducing
investment, it allows for a deeper understanding of the interplay between pricing and investment
decisions.
Our model is also strictly related to the contribution by Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and the
literature on multiple-signal games. Early contributions are the work by Milgrom and Roberts
(1986), who studied pricing and advertising decisions as signals of quality, and the models of entry
1Notice that this result does not necessarily mean that limit pricing will never limit entry when the incumbent has
the opportunity to invest. As shown in Brighi, D’amato and Piccolo (2005), Brighi and D’Amato (2014) and In and
Wright (2017), limit pricing may still have deterring effects on entry when investment is not publicly observable by
potential entrants.
3
by Bagwell and Ramey (1988) and Bagwell (2007), where pricing and advertising are used by the
incumbent to signal information about costs. Our game, however, differs from the above models
because investment, unlike advertisement, has persistent effects. A broader interpretation of invest-
ment as advertising with a permanent effect on the installed base of customers, is consistent with
the basic features of our model, which may be used to extend the analysis of Bagwell and Ramey
(1988) to the case in which advertising, affecting post entry as well as pre-entry market demand, has
a commitment value. Finally, we also notice that Bagwell (2007) obtains a result which is analogous
to our finding as he shows that limit pricing and advertising do not deter profitable entry. However,
his result rests on a completely different kind of analysis and specifically on the assumption that
the entrant’s response to signals is not binary, but smoothly changing with beliefs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the entry problem and the
signaling model is formalized in section 3. Section 4 contains the equilibrium analysis, while the last
section provides a summary and some final remarks. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 An entry problem with investment and private information
We consider a standard two periods entry model where an incumbent firm faces the potential entry
of a competing firm in a market for a homogeneous good. In the first period firm 1, the incumbent,
who has private information about his costs of production, decides how much to produce, q ≥ 0, and
how much to invest in a cost reducing technology, e ≥ 0. In the second period firm 2, the entrant,
after observing incumbent’s choice, decides whether to enter into the market. If entry occurs, firm 2
pays an entry cost, learns the incumbent’s production costs (learning upon entry) and firms compete
a` la Cournot. Otherwise, firm 1 remains a monopolist and the potential entrant gains her outside
option normalized to zero.
Marginal costs are constant and depend on investment, while fixed costs of production are set
to zero for convenience. There are only two types of incumbent, type L with a low marginal cost
(efficient incumbent) and type H with a high marginal cost (inefficient incumbent). We denote by
θt(e) ≥ 0 the marginal cost of type t, with t = L,H, hence θH(e) < θL(e). The symbol θt stands for
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θt(0). The prior probability that the incumbent is inefficient is denoted by β.
Heterogeneity of marginal costs suggests that the cost-reducing impact of investment differs
across types of incumbent. In fact, as the more efficient firm is closer to the technological frontier,
it is unlikely that his chances to enhance cost efficiency are the same as those of the other firms. It
is reasonable to assume that the same level of investment is more effective in cutting costs if it is
undertaken by the inefficient incumbent rather than by the efficient one. Indeed, being further away
from the technological frontier the inefficient incumbent can more easily catch up with technological
progress. To simplify the analysis, we will assume that the cost-reducing effect of investment for the
efficient incumbent is negligible and precisely that θL(e) = θL for all e. The inefficient incumbent,
instead, has the opportunity to reduce the cost gap with respect to type L by investing. The cost
reducing technology of the high cost type, θH(e), is represented by a strictly decreasing differentiable
function, with θH(e) > θL for all e. The most important implication of assuming heterogeneity in
the cost-reducing effect is that investment may be used by the incumbent to signal his cost of
production.
Investment is made by the incumbent in the first period and affects current as well as future
marginal costs. Having long-term effects, investment enables the incumbent to influence post-entry
competition, hence it has a commitment value. In other words, the incumbent can invest strategically
in the first period in order to limit entry of firm 2 in the second.
Market demand in each period is described by an inverse demand function, p(q), which is assumed
to be differentiable and strictly decreasing. The per period incumbent’s profits (gross of investment
costs e) are given by Πt(e, q) ≡ [p(q) − θt(e)]q. The function Πt(e, q) is differentiable and strictly
quasi-concave in q, so that, for each level of e, the incumbent’s per period profit maximization
problem has a unique solution, the monopoly quantity denoted by mt(e). Monopoly profits, which
are strictly positive, are denoted by Mt(e) ≡ Πt(e,mt(e)). For convenience of notation we define
mt ≡ mt(0) and Mt ≡ Mt(0). It can be noticed that the L type monopoly quantity and profit are
independent of investment, i.e. mL(e) = mL and ML(e) = ML.
Incumbent’s profits in the second period depend on the entry decision by firm 2, which will be
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denoted by y ∈ {0, 1}, with y = 1 if entry takes place and 0 otherwise. If entry does not take place,
the incumbent remains a monopolist and earns Mt(e), while firm 2 makes zero profits. If entry
occurs, instead, the two firms compete in quantities and earn duopoly profits. Having persistent
effects on incumbent’s costs, investment affects post-entry profits of both firms. Incumbent’s duopoly
profits are denoted by Dt(e) ≥ 0, while entrant’s duopoly profits, net of entry fee, are denoted by
D2(e, t), because they also depend on the type of incumbent she faces. We define Dt ≡ Dt(0)
and D2(t) ≡ D2(0, t). Incumbent profits DH(e) are increasing and entrant’s profits D2(e,H) are
decreasing in e, whereas DL(e) = DL and D2(e, L) = D2(L).
The incumbent’s decision about q and e, is based on total profits over the two periods that,
assuming no time discounting, are given by
Vt(e, q, y) = Πt(e, q)− e+ yDt(e) + (1− y)Mt(e). (1)
The function VH(e, q, y) is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave in e and q. If the incumbent decides
to accommodate entry, he will produce the monopoly output in the first period and he will choose
the optimal level of investment taking into account that duopoly profits will be made in the second
period. The total profits will be respectively given by V AL = VL(0,mL, 1) = ML + DL, for type L,
and by
V AH = maxe
VH(e,mH(e), 1) (2)
for type H. The maximizing level of investment in problem (2) is denoted by eA and the associated
monopoly quantity by mA ≡ mH(eA).
Firm 2 will make her entry decision on the basis of her expected profits. After observing first
period incumbent’s choice, the entrant will make an inference about incumbent’s cost. Her beliefs
about the probability of the incumbent being of type H are denote by βˆ and her expected post-entry
profits are given by
βˆD2(e,H) + (1− βˆ)D2(L). (3)
Firm 2 enters only if expected profits are strictly positive.
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To let investment play a role in the entry problem we have to introduce a few assumptions.
First of all, we will require a positive level of investment for entry deterrence to take place and in
particular a level exceeding that undertaken by the inefficient incumbent to accommodate entry. We
assume that entry is never profitable against a low cost incumbent, i.e. D2(L) < 0 and that firm 2
post-entry profits are strictly positive if she faces an inefficient incumbent, regardless of the level of
investment undertaken, i.e. D2(e,H) > 0. In addition, we suppose that firm 2 expected post-entry
profits (at prior belief) are strictly positive if the incumbent invests the amount of accommodation,
i.e.
βD2(eA, H) + (1− β)D2(L) > 0 (4)
An immediate consequence of (4) is that deterrence of profitable entry requires a higher level of
investment than eA. Hence, to ensure that investment can actually deter entry we assume that there
exists a level of investment e0, the investment of deterrence, at which firm 2 expected post-entry
profits vanish, i.e.
βD2(e0, H) + (1− β)D2(L) = 0. (5)
The investment of deterrence e0 is strictly related to market entry conditions. High values of e0 are
associated with favourable entry conditions and vice-versa.
The main consequences of the above assumptions is that e0 > eA, namely in order to deter entry
the incumbent must over invest as compared to the level of investment undertaken to accommodate
entry. The next two conditions are introduced to ensure that the choice to deter profitable entry by
undertaking a level of investment e0 is preferred to accommodation by any type of incumbent. We
assume that
VH(e0,mL, 0) > V
A
H . (6)
and
VL(e0,mL, 0) > V
A
L . (7)
The problem that will be addressed is whether the incumbent will over invest to deter profitable
entry or whether he will invest to accommodate entry, when he owns private information about his
costs. To answer this question we will formalize the problem as a signaling game.
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3 The signaling game
The entry problem outlined in the previous section will be modeled as a multiple signaling game. In
fact, not only investment can be used as a commitment variable being an irreversible and publicly
observable choice affecting post-entry competition, but it can also play a role as a signal along with
price. As it is well known, price acts as a signal because a price cut is cheaper for the low cost
incumbent. Similarly, being purely dissipative for type L and cost reducing for type H, investment
is ‘more expensive’ for the efficient incumbent, who can use it to reveal his cost to the entrant.2
Therefore, our entry problem can be formalized as a game with multiple signals and in fact, it has
some similarities with the models studied by Bagwell and Ramey (1988) and Bagwell (2007).
The timing of the game is as follows. Nature moves first and chooses the type of incumbent.
After observing his costs, the incumbent decides his first period output (or price) and a level of
investment, i.e. he sends the two signals q and e. Next the potential entrant, who does not know
the type of incumbent, observes the signals and decides whether to enter or not into the market.
Finally, payoffs are received. The cost reducing technology θH(e), the marginal cost θL, the prior
probability β, market demand p(q) and duopoly profits Dt(e) and D2(e, t) are common knowledge,
whereas type t is private information to the incumbent.
Players strategies and beliefs are as follows. A pure strategy for the incumbent is a function
which associates with each type a level of investment and a first period quantity and consists of
two pairs, (eH , qH) and (eL, qL). A pure strategy by firm 2 associates the entry decision to any
observable choice by the incumbent and it is denoted by y(e, q) ∈ {0, 1}. A system of beliefs for
firm 2 is a function βˆ which associates the ex post probability of the H type to any observable choice
by the incumbent, (e, q). The incumbent’s payoff is given by (1), the entrant’s payoff is given by
D2t(e) in the case of entry and is equal to zero otherwise. To find a solution to the signaling game
the standard notion of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is applied.3
2Notice that investment retains its character of signal even if it is cost reducing for the L type, provided that the
effect of investment is larger for type H than for type L.
3See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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Definition 1. A profile of strategies (et, qt) and y(e, q), with t = H,L, is a PBE of the signaling
game with investment, if there exist beliefs βˆ(e, q) satisfying the following conditions:
(i) The incumbent’s strategy is optimal, i.e. (et, qt) = argmax Vt(e, q, y(e, q)), for t = H,L
(ii) The entrant’s strategy is optimal, i.e. y(e, q) = 1 if and only if
βˆ(e, q)D2(e,H) + (1− βˆ(e, q))D2(L) > 0.
(iii) Beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule.
Condition 1.(iii) places restrictions only on beliefs along the equilibrium path. Specifically, if
(et, qt) is an incumbent’s equilibrium strategy, consistency of beliefs requires that βˆ(eH , qH) = β if
(eH , qH) = (eL, qL) and βˆ(eH , qH) = 1, βˆ(eL, qL) = 0 if (eH , qH) 6= (eL, qL). As typical in signaling
games, the lack of restrictions on off-equilibrium beliefs generates a multiplicity of equilibria which
will be refined by applying the Intuitive Criterion originally proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987).
Recall that the Intuitive Criterion is built on the notion of equilibrium domination, which states
that a deviation from a given equilibrium is equilibrium dominated for type t if the equilibrium payoff
is greater than the best conceivable payoff that type t may obtain from that deviation. Formally, let
V ∗t denote the payoff to type t in a given equilibrium, then a deviation (e˜, q˜) from the equilibrium
choice (et, qt) is equilibrium dominated for type t if V
∗
t > Vt(e˜, q˜, 0), as total profits are greater
under no entry. Beliefs supporting a given equilibrium satisfy the Intuitive Criterion if, whenever a
deviation is equilibrium dominated for type t and strictly preferred by type t′, the entrant does not
assign that deviation to type t. For example, if the deviation (e˜, q˜) is equilibrium dominated for H
and strictly preferred by L given the entrant’s best reply to L, i.e. if
VH(eH , qH , y(eH , qH)) > VH(e˜, q˜, 0) (8)
VL(eL, qL, y(eL, qL)) < VL(e˜, q˜, 0), (9)
the off-equilibrium belief must be βˆ(e˜, q˜) = 0. With these beliefs, however, the incumbent’s strategy
of the given equilibrium is not optimal. Thus, if (8) and (9) hold, the equilibrium strategy does not
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meet the Intuitive Criterion. Following Cho and Kreps (1987, p. 202), an intuitive equilibrium is
formally defined as follows.
Definition 2. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, (et, qt) and y(e, q), with t = H,L, is intuitive if
there exists no deviation (e˜, q˜) 6= (et, qt) such that (8) and (9) hold.4
In the next section we will study pure strategy equilibria and work out the solution to the sig-
naling game. The following standard condition will be used to guarantee the existence of separating
equilibria5
ML −DL ≥MH −DH . (10)
Condition (10) simply states that the low cost incumbent benefits from entry deterrence more than
the high cost incumbent. Finally, in order to avoid trivial forms of separation, we assume that the
high cost incumbent has an incentive to mimic the low cost one, i.e.
VH(0,mL, 0) > V
A
H . (11)
4 No deterrence of profitable entry
Let us consider separating and pooling equilibria in turn. A separating equilibrium is a PBE where
different types of incumbent make different choices or, equivalently, where (eH , qH) 6= (eL, qL). In a
separating equilibrium information is fully revealed, therefore the entrant only enters when she faces
a high cost incumbent. The H type accommodates entry, i.e. he produces the monopoly quantity
in the first period and the duopoly quantity after entry, and decides a level of investment which
maximizes total profits. Hence, the equilibrium choice for the H type is eH = eA and qH = mA and
the maximum total profit from accommodation (given by (2)) is V AH = MH(eA)− eA +DH(eA).
4Notice that we need not consider the further requirement, implied by Cho and Kreps (1987), that there is no
deviation satisfying (i) V ∗L > VL(e˜, q˜, 0) and (ii) V
∗
H < VH(e˜, q˜, 1). Indeed, a deviation will never satisfy (ii) as, when
entry takes place, total profit for H is always lower than the equilibrium payoff.
5See, for instance, Tirole (1988) or Bagwell and Ramey (1988).
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The equilibrium choice by the L type, (eL, qL), must satisfy the ‘incentive compatibility condition’
for the H type, i.e.
VH(eL, qL, 0) ≤ V AH . (12)
In other words, the high cost incumbent should prefer accommodating entry rather than mimicking
the efficient type. Furthermore, the L type total profit at equilibrium must be greater than the
‘accommodation profit’ V AL , i.e. the total profit he may earn by undertaking no investment, pro-
ducing the monopoly output in the first period and the duopoly quantity in the second. Thus, the
equilibrium choice (eL, qL) must satisfy the ‘participation condition’
VL(eL, qL, 0) ≥ V AL . (13)
It is not difficult to see that an incumbent’s strategy with (eH , qH) = (eA,mA) and (eL, qL)
satisfying (12) and (13) supports a separating equilibrium.6 For example, consider the system of
beliefs assigning to the high cost type any choice different from (eL, qL), i.e. βˆ(e, q) = 1 for any
(e, q) 6= (eL, qL) and 0 otherwise, and the entrant’s strategy y(e, q) = 1 for any (e, q) 6= (eL, qL) and
0 otherwise. This profile of strategies and the specified system of beliefs are easily seen to satisfy
Definition 1.
Although the freedom in the choice of off-equilibrium beliefs gives rise to a multiplicity of equi-
libria, it turns out that there is a unique separating equilibrium surviving the Intuitive Criterion.7
Proposition 1. In the signaling game with investment, there exists a unique separating equilib-
rium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion. The equilibrium is supported by the incumbent’s strategy
(eH , qH) = (eA,mA) and (eL, qL) = (0, q
∗), where q∗ is implicitly defined by the equation
VH(0, q
∗, 0) = V AH . (14)
Moreover, q∗ > mL.
6For a formal proof see Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
7By uniqueness we mean that the same incumbent strategy is shared by all the equilibria.
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qVH , VL
VL(0, q, 0)VH(0, q, 0)
mL
VL(0,mL, 0)
VL(0, q
∗, 0)
q∗mH
V AH
V AL
Figure 1: Intuitive separating equilibrium quantity.
In the intuitive separating equilibrium, the inefficient incumbent invests as much as needed to
accommodate entry and charges his monopoly price. The efficient incumbent, instead, cuts down
investment to zero and sets a limit price, i.e. a price below the monopoly level. By so doing he is
able to signal his cost to the entrant who stays out. Notice that, in the separating equilibrium, limit
pricing does not deter profitable entry, because firm 2 stays out exactly when entry is unprofitable.
Figure 1, where total profits of both types of incumbent are depicted as functions of q at e = 0,
illustrates the result of Proposition 1 by deriving the equilibrium output q∗, which is shown to exceed
the level of monopoly of the low cost type.
Let us turn to the analysis of pooling equilibria. A pooling equilibrium is a PBE where all types
of incumbent send the same signals: (eL, qL) = (eH , qH) = (eP , qP ). Since the entrant does not
learn any new piece of information from the observation of the equilibrium choice, the beliefs about
the incumbent type are unmodified and they are equal to prior probabilities, i.e. βˆ(eP , qP ) = β. In
a pooling equilibrium entry can not take place, because otherwise each type of incumbent would be
better off by choosing his own monopoly output in the first period. As firm 2 expected post-entry
12
profits must be non positive, the incumbent is required to undertake a sufficiently high level of
investment and, precisely, a level not lower than e0 as defined by (5), hence eP ≥ e0. Furthermore,
the incumbent’s strategy must allow each type to obtain at least the payoff earned if entry is
accommodated, which means that the following ‘participation conditions’ are satisfied:
VH(eP , qP , 0) ≥ V AH , (15)
VL(eP , qP , 0) ≥ V AL . (16)
It turns out that a pooling equilibrium is characterized by an incumbent’s strategy satisfying (15)
and (16), with eP ≥ e0 (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix). Under conditions (6) and (7), there is
a multiplicity of pooling equilibria and, in particular, there exists a pooling equilibrium supported
by the incumbent’s strategy (eP , qP ) = (e0,mL), i.e. the equilibrium where both types play the
minimum level of investment consistent with entry deterrence and the monopoly quantity of the low
cost incumbent, while firm 2 does not enter. This is the most profitable pooling equilibrium from
the point of view of the efficient incumbent, as his profit is VL(0,mL, 0) = 2ML − e0. Notice also
that if the investment of deterrence is not too high, i.e. entry conditions are not much favourable,
it may well happen that ML − e0 > ΠL(0, q∗), so that total profits of the efficient incumbent are
greater under the pooling equilibrium than under the intuitive separating equilibrium characterized
in Proposition 1, i.e. VL(0,mL, 0) > VL(0, q
∗, 0). In other words, not only the inefficient type, but
also the efficient incumbent is better off when profitable entry is deterred.
In a pooling equilibrium, the two signals provide the entrant with no new piece of information
about incumbent’s cost, so that the level of investment exceeding e0 is able to modify the perceived
profitability of entry to firm 2. Hence, matched with a suitable pricing policy, investment gains a
value of commitment which allows the incumbent to deter profitable entry. In order to be supported,
however, a pooling equilibrium requires the efficient type to send a completely dissipative signal in
terms of investment expenditures that have no reducing impact on his costs. Is this dissipative
behaviour plausible? Or, equally, is there any pooling equilibrium surviving the Intuitive Criterion?
It turns out that no pooling equilibrium exists which meets the conditions set out by Definition 2.
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Proposition 2. In the signaling game with investment there are no pooling equilibria satisfying the
Intuitive Criterion.
The logic behind the result of Proposition 2 is quite straightforward. By cutting down investment
to zero and increasing quantities above the level stipulated in the candidate pooling equilibrium,
an efficient incumbent can persuade the entrant that such a low price in the deviation with no
investment can not be profitable to an inefficient incumbent, whereas it allows type L to save on
the dissipation of useless expenses. The use of investment as a signal by the efficient incumbent
prevents the inefficient one to use investment as a commitment variable. More generally, it is the
fact that investment has a different cost-reducing impact across types, and so can act as a signal,
to make the pooling equilibrium impossible to survive the application of the Intuitive Criterion.8
The overall analysis of the signaling model with investment provides an unambiguous prediction
of the most plausible outcome of the game, which is the unique intuitive separating equilibrium
characterized in Proposition 1. Surprisingly, in the the presence of private information about costs,
the strategic use of investment can not be fully exploited by the incumbent. In fact, investment is
undertaken only to accommodate rather than to deter profitable entry.
Finally, we notice that the main point of our analysis still survives even if the cost reducing
impact of investment were strong enough to allow the inefficient incumbent to cut down to zero
post-entry profits to firm 2. As can be seen, even in such a case only a separating equilibrium passes
the Intuitive Criterion test and in such equilibrium the inefficient incumbent will over invest to deter
unprofitable entry. The point remains that strategic investment can not be used to deter profitable
entry when private information about incumbent’s costs is present.
8It is interesting to notice that the Intuitive Criterion does not rule out, in general, pooling equilibria either in
the original model of limit pricing put forward by Milgrom and Roberts (1982) or in the model with advertising by
Bagwell and Ramey (1988).
14
5 Summary and conclusions
We studied a model of entry in which an incumbent, who is privately informed as to his costs, has
the opportunity to undertake a long run investment in a cost reducing activity. Having persistent
effects on post-entry competition, investment has a commitment value. Moreover, as investment is
assumed to have an heterogeneous effect across types it also acts, along with price, as a signal of
incumbent’s costs.
We analysed the strategic use of investment in limiting entry by means of a signaling game a`
la Milgrom and Roberts (1982) with multiple signals. The entry game was specified so as to leave
to the inefficient incumbent two alternative options, either to invest to accommodate entry, or to
over invest to deter profitable entry. Our primary interest was to find whether investment gains any
further value of commitment, when the entrant is uncertain about incumbent’s costs.
Although both pooling and separating equilibria are possible in our setting, we found that
only a separating equilibrium can be the solution to the entry problem, because it is the sole
equilibrium surviving the Intuitive Criterion. In this equilibrium, the inefficient incumbent invests
to accommodate entry while the efficient one makes zero investment and charges a limit price to
signal his cost to the entrant who stays out. Hence, we conclude that the strategic use of investment
under conditions of private information is limited, in fact investment will only be undertaken to
accommodate rather than to deter profitable entry. This result, which is due to the double role of
investment as a commitment variable and as a signal, obtains because the signaling role of investment
to the efficient incumbent cancels out its commitment value to the inefficient one.
The major implication of this result for the analysis of competition policy is that in markets
where the costs of the incumbent are not directly observable by potential entrants, it is highly likely
that strategic investment is mainly undertaken by inefficient incumbents to accommodate entry.
Of course, if investment had a cost-reducing effect strong enough to bring down to zero entrant’s
post-entry profits, an inefficient incumbent would over invest to deter entry. In such a case, as usual,
the investment behaviour of the incumbent should be evaluated by antitrust authorities on the basis
of its overall welfare effects. In any case, whether investment has strong cost-reducing effects or
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not, in the presence of private information about incumbent’s cost, investment does not gain any
commitment value that allows the incumbent to deter profitable entry.
Appendix
Lemma 1 An incumbent’s strategy supports a separating equilibrium if and only if (eH , qH) =
(eA,mA) and (eL, qL) satisfies (12) and (13).
Proof of Lemma A.1
Let (eH , qH) = (eA,mA) and (eL, qL) satisfy (12) and (13). We have to show that the incumbent’s
strategy supports a separating equilibrium. Take the beliefs which assign to the H type any choice
different from (eL, qL), i.e. βˆ(e, q) = 1 for any (e, q) 6= (eL, qL) and βˆ(e, q) = 0 for (e, q) = (eL, qL).
These beliefs obey Bayes’ rule. Given these beliefs and the assumption D2(e,H) > 0, firm 2 expected
profits are strictly positive except when (e, q) = (eL, qL), thus the entrant’s strategy, y(e, q) = 0 if
(e, q) = (eL, qL) and 1 otherwise, satisfies Definition 1.(ii). Let us show that the incumbent’s strategy
is optimal given the entrant’s strategy. As regard to type H, we have VH(eA,mA, 1) ≥ VH(e, q, y(e, q))
for all (e, q). Indeed, for (e, q) 6= (eL, qL), we have y(e, q) = 1 and the inequality holds by definition
of eA; moreover, for (e, q) = (eL, qL) the above inequality is satisfied because of (12). As for type L,
we have VL(eL, qL, 0) ≥ VL(e, q, y(e, q)) for all (e, q). Indeed, for (e, q) 6= (eL, qL) firm 2 enters, then
y(e, q) = 1 and the inequality holds because of (13) and definition of V AL ; if (e, q) = (eL, qL) firm 2
does not enter and the above inequality holds as an equality. This completes the first part of the
proof.
To show the converse let us suppose that the incumbent’s strategy (eH , qH) and (eL, qL) supports
a separating equilibrium, so that βˆ(eH , qH) = y(eH , qH) = 1 and βˆ(eL, qL) = y(eL, qL) = 0. By
Definition 1.(i), VH(eH , qH , 1) ≥ VH(e, q, y(e, q)) and, by definition of eA as the solution of (2),
we have VH(eA,mA, 1) ≥ VH(eH , qH , 1). Hence, as (eA,mA) is optimal for type H it must be
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(eH , qH) = (eA,mA). Next, we have to show that (eL, qL) satisfies (12) and (13). Let us suppose, to
the contrary, that (eL, qL) violates (12); then (eA,mA) cannot be an optimal choice for type H, as
(eL, qL) gives higher profits because avoids entry (y(eL, qL) = 0). Now let us suppose that (eL, qL)
violates (13); then (eL, qL) cannot be an optimal choice for L because (0,mL) gives higher profits
even when Firm 2 enters, therefore these contradictions complete the proof. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 An incumbent’s strategy, (et, qt) with t = H,L, supports an intuitive separating equi-
librium if and only if (eH , qH) = (eA,mA) and (eL, qL) is a solution to the following maximization
problem9
max
e,q
ΠL(q)− e
subject to ΠH(e, q)− e+MH(e) ≤ V AH (17)
ΠL(q)− e ≥ DL (18)
Proof of Lemma 2
Let us suppose that (e∗, q∗) is a solution to the maximization problem. We have to show that the
incumbent’s strategy, (eH , qH) = (eA,mA) and (eL, qL) = (e
∗, q∗), supports an intuitive separating
equilibrium. First, notice that (e∗, q∗) satisfies (12) and (13) since these inequalities are equivalent
to (17) and (18) respectively. Therefore, by Lemma 1, (eH , qH) = (eA,mA) and (eL, qL) = (e
∗, q∗),
supports a separating equilibrium. To show that the equilibrium is intuitive, let us suppose that
there exists a deviation (e˜, q˜) 6= (e∗, q∗), which is equilibrium dominated for H, i.e. VH(e˜, q˜, 0) <
VH(eA,mA, 1), but not for L, i.e. VL(e˜, q˜, 0) > VL(e
∗, q∗, 0). Therefore, (e˜, q˜) satisfies (17), but from
the last inequality ΠL(q˜)− e˜ > ΠL(q∗)−e∗. Therefore, (e∗, q∗) is not a solution to the maximization
problem contrary to the assumption. This contradiction completes the first part of the proof.
To show the converse, let us suppose that the incumbent’s strategy, (eH , qH) = (eA,mA) and
(eL, qL) = (e
∗, q∗), supports an intuitive separating equilibrium. We have to show that (e∗, q∗) is a so-
lution to the maximization problem. Let us proceed by contradiction and suppose that (e∗, q∗) is not
9Since the L type profit does not depend on e, for ease of notation, we set ΠL(q) = ΠL(e, q).
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a solution, i.e. there exists a pair (e′, q′) satisfying (17) and (18) such that ΠL(q′)−e′ > ΠL(q∗)−e∗.
From the last inequality it immediately follows that VL(e
′, q′, 0) > VL(e∗, q∗, 0). If the constraint
(17) is not binding, so that VH(e
′, q′, 0) < V AH , the deviation (e
′, q′) violates Definition 2 and
(eL, qL) = (e
∗, q∗) cannot support an intuitive separating equilibrium, contrary to the assump-
tion. Therefore, (17) must be binding so that VH(e
′, q′, 0) = V AH . Then, one can find in a small
neighbourhood of q′ a quantity q′′ such that VL(e′, q′′, 0) > VL(e∗, q∗, 0) and VH(e′, q′′, 0) < V AH ,
so that the deviation (e′, q′′) violates Definition 2 and the equilibrium cannot be intuitive contrary
to the assumption. In order to show the existence of q′′ one can argue as follows. By continu-
ity of ΠL there exists an open interval centred at q
′, B = {q | |q − q′| < ε, ε > 0}, such that
VL(e
′, q, 0) > VL(e∗, q∗, 0) for all q ∈ B; moreover, by strict quasi-concavity of ΠH there exists
q′′ ∈ B such that VH(e′, q′′, 0) < V AH . In fact, note first that q′ can not be a minimum for VH(e′, q, 0)
since profits are unbounded from below. Hence q′ can either be a maximum for VH(e′, q, 0) or not
a maximum. If q′ is a maximum, then by strict quasi-concavity it is unique and the existence of q′′
follows immediately by the definition of maximum. If q′ is not a maximum, then by strict quasi-
concavity, VH(e
′, q, 0) is either a strictly increasing or a strictly decreasing function of q in an open
interval centred at q′, and this is sufficient to show that q′′ exists. In conclusion, we have shown
that (e∗, q∗) is a solution to the maximization problem and this completes the proof of the lemma.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Let us first show that there exists a unique solution to equation (14) and that q∗ > mL. First
of all we know that VH(0, q, 0) = ΠH(0, q) + MH is continuous in q. By assumption (11), we have
VH(0,mL, 0) > V
A
H . Moreover, let qc > mL be the competitive market quantity, i.e. a finite quantity
such that ΠL(qc) = 0. Then ΠH(0, qc) < 0 and VH(0, qc, 0) < MH < V
A
H , since V
A
H ≥ MH + DH .
Thus by continuity of VH , equation (14) has at least a solution in the interval ]mL, qc[. Finally,
uniqueness of the solution is established by showing that VH(0, q, 0), or equivalently ΠH(0, q), is
strictly decreasing for q in the interval ]mL, qc[. This is easily seen by noting that the profit function
is strictly quasi concave and that its maximum is mH < mL.
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Next, by Lemma 2, we have to show that (0, q∗) is a solution of the maximization problem,
i.e. ΠL(q
∗) > ΠL(q) − e for all (e, q) 6= (0, q∗) satisfying (17) and (18). Let us first consider the
maximization problem with only the constraint (17) and separately consider the two cases (e, q)
with q > q∗ and (e, q) with q < q∗. If q > q∗ then q > mL and the profit function ΠL(q) is strictly
decreasing. Therefore, we have ΠL(q
∗) > ΠL(q) so that ΠL(q∗) > ΠL(q)−e for all (e, q) with q > q∗.
Let us turn to the second case, i.e. (e, q) satisfying (17) with q < q∗. By definition of q∗, i.e. by
equation (14), the constraint (17) can be rewritten as follows
ΠH(e, q)− e+MH(e) ≤ ΠH(0, q∗) +MH
or
ΠH(0, q
∗) + (MH −MH(e)) ≥ ΠH(e, q)− e.
Since monopoly profits are decreasing in costs, MH−MH(e) ≤ 0 for e ≥ 0, therefore if (e, q) satisfies
(17) it also satisfies
ΠH(0, q
∗) ≥ ΠH(e, q)− e
or
[p(q∗)− θH ]q∗ ≥ [p(q)− θH(e)]q − e. (19)
Moreover, since q < q∗ and θH ≥ θH(e), it must be true that
(θH − θL)q∗ ≥ (θH(e)− θL)q (20)
Adding term by term the inequalities (19) and (20) yields
(p(q∗)− θL)q∗ > (p(q)− θL)q − e
or ΠL(q
∗) > ΠL(q)− e for all (e, q) satisfying (17) with q < q∗.
In order to complete the proof we have to show that (0, q∗) also satisfies (18). Notice that, by
definition of q∗, we have
ΠH(0, q
∗) +MH = MH(eA)− eA +DH(eA) (21)
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By definition of V AH it must hold
MH(eA)− eA +DH(eA) ≥MH +DH (22)
Thus, (21) and (22) imply ΠH(0, q
∗) ≥ DH and after simple manipulations
DL −DH ≥ DL −ΠH(0, q∗) (23)
Next, let us consider
ΠL(q
∗)−ΠH(0, q∗) = (θH − θL)q∗
> (θH − θL)mL
= ML −ΠH(0,mL)
> ML −MH (24)
where the first inequality follows from q∗ > mL and the last inequality from MH > ΠH(0,mL). By
assumption (10), we have ML −MH ≥ DL −DH so that from (23) and (24) it follows
ΠL(q
∗)−ΠH(0, q∗) > DL −ΠH(0, q∗)
and finally ΠL(q
∗) > DL. This completes the proof of Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 The incumbent’s strategy (et, qt) = (eP , qP ), with t = H,L, supports a pooling equilibrium
if and only if (eP , qP ) satisfies (15), (16) and eP ≥ e0, where e0 is the zero expected profit level of
investment defined by (5).
Proof of Lemma 3
Let (eP , qP ) satisfy (15) and (16) with eP ≥ e0. We have to show that it supports a pooling
equilibrium. Let us take the beliefs βˆ(e, q) = β if (e, q) = (eP , qP ) and 1 otherwise, which are
consistent with Bayes rule, Definition 1.(iii). Given these beliefs, take the entrant’s strategy y(e, q) =
0 if (e, q) = (eP , qP ) and 1 otherwise. The incumbent’s strategy is optimal for type H. In fact, if
(e, q) 6= (eP , qP ) then y(e, q) = 1 and, by definition of V AH , we have V AH ≥ VH(e, q, y(e, q)) and finally,
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by (15), VH(eP , qP , 0) ≥ VH(e, q, y(e, q)). With a similar argument it is easily shown that (eP , qP )
is optimal for type L, so that the incumbent’s strategy satisfies Definition 1.(i). Let us show that
also the entrant’s strategy is optimal. If y(e, q) = 1, then (e, q) 6= (eP , qP ) and βˆ(e, q) = 1, thus the
entrant expected profits are strictly positive. Vice versa, if at (e, q) the expected profits are strictly
positive then (e, q) 6= (eP , qP ), because βˆ(eP , qP ) = β and eP ≥ e0 imply, by (5), non positive
entrant’s expected profits. Thus, (e, q) 6= (eP , qP ) and by the definition of y we have y(e, q) = 1 and
Definition 1.(ii) is satisfied.
Let us show the converse and suppose that (eH , qH) = (eL, qL) = (eP , qP ) supports a pooling
equilibrium. Then, by Definition 1.(iii), βˆ(eP , qP ) = β and y(eP , qP ) = 0, because if y(eP , qP ) = 1
the pooling strategy would not be an optimal strategy for the incumbent. Therefore, the entrant
expected profits must be non positive, which means, by (5), that eP ≥ e0. Consider next the choice
of L. Since by Definition 1.(i) VL(eP , qP , 0) ≥ VL(0,mL, y(0,mL)) and since VL(0,mL, 0) is the
highest total profit, it must be y(0,mL) = 1 thus VL(eP , qP , 0) ≥ VL(0,mL, 1) = V AL and (16) holds.
Consider the choice of type H. Since by Definition 1.(i) VH(eP , qP , 0) ≥ VH(eA,mA, y(eA,mA)) and
since VH(eA,mA, y(eA,mA)) ≥ V AH then VH(eP , qP , 0) ≥ V AH and (15) is satisfied. This completes
the proof of Lemma 3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let us deal with two cases separately, qP < mL and qP ≥ mL. The case qP < mL is straightforward.
Indeed, a pooling equilibrium supported by the quantity qP cannot be intuitive because the deviation
q˜ = mL is equilibrium dominated for type H and strictly preferred by type L.
Next, turn to the case qP ≥ mL. Let (eP , qP ) be the pooling equilibrium strategy of the
incumbent. We show that there exists a deviation (0, q˜) which is equilibrium dominated for the H
type and strictly preferred to the equilibrium choice by the L type. Let q˜ > mL be defined by the
equality
ΠL(qP )−ΠL(q˜) = eP −  (25)
where  > 0 is arbitrarily close to zero so that eP− > 0. The quantity q˜ is well defined and q˜ > qP .10
10Let us consider the function of q, ΠL(q)− [ΠL(qP )− eP + ] and notice that by (16) the term in square brackets
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Let us consider the deviation (0, q˜) and show that it is strictly preferred to the equilibrium choice
by the L type. Indeed,
VL(0, q˜, 0)− VL(eP , qP , 0) = ΠL(q˜) +ML −ΠL(qP ) + eP −ML
= ΠL(q˜)−ΠL(qP ) + eP
= − eP + eP =  > 0
where we used (25).
Before showing that the same deviation is equilibrium dominated for the H type let us derive
the following result.
ΠH(eP , qP )−ΠH(0, q˜) − ΠL(qP ) + ΠL(q˜) =
= −θH(eP )qP + θH q˜ + θLqP − θLq˜
= (θH − θL)(q˜ − qP ) + (θH − θH(eP ))qP > 0 (26)
where the second equality follows by adding and subtracting θHqP and the last inequality from
q˜ > qP . By (25) and (26) we have ΠH(0, q˜) − ΠH(eP , qP ) + eP < . Subtracting to both sides
MH(eP )−MH > 0 yields
ΠH(0, q˜) +MH −ΠH(eP , qP ) + eP −MH(eP ) < − [MH(eP )−MH ] (27)
where the LHS is the variation of type H total profits after the deviation (0, q˜), i.e.
VH(0, q˜, 0)− VH(eP , qP , 0) = ΠH(0, q˜) +MH −ΠH(eP , qP ) + eP −MH(eP ). (28)
(27) and (28) give
VH(0, q˜, 0)− VH(eP , qP , 0) < − [MH(eP )−MH ] < 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the term in square brackets is strictly positive
and  can be taken arbitrarily close to zero. Therefore, we have shown that the deviation (0, q˜) is
is strictly positive. Clearly, for q = mL the function is strictly positive and at the perfectly competitive quantity, qc,
the above function is strictly negative since ΠL(qc) = 0. Thus, by continuity there exists q˜ satisfying (25) in the open
interval ]mL, qc[. Moreover, since for q > mL the profit function is strictly decreasing, q˜ is unique.
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equilibrium dominated for the H type. Since for any pooling equilibrium one can find a deviation
which is equilibrium dominated for the H type and strictly preferred by the L type, by Definition
2 there exists no pooling equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion and this completes the proof
of Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
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